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Abstract 
 
On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared independence, ending its nine years 
unresolved status. The principal goal was, and remains, the need to involve 
different communities in the state structures. The new state, which aims to fulfil 
all the obligations set by the Ahtisaari plan, is trying to complete the 
decentralization process the implementation  of which continuous to face 
obstacles in the two main communities: the Serbs and the Albanians. This article 
discusses matters related to community acceptance of the decentralization 
process, the functioning of the parallel structures, the situation in North Kosovo 
and the on -  going talks between Pristina and Belgrade. The article provides 
evidences that while the implementation of the decentralization process is the 
best possibility for Kosovo, it must not follow only an ethnic line.  
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Ongoing Pristina – Belgrade Talks: from 
Decentralization to Regional Cooperation and 
Future Perspectives. 
Entela Cukani 
 
 
1. Introduction 
At the end of negotiations to settle its status, Kosovo declared independence 
on 17 February 2008, ending nine years’ of endeavour since the beginning of 
the war in 1999, to resolve its status. Kosovo is now going through a period of 
significant transition to build democratic institutions and to guarantee an 
inclusive multi-ethnic society, with the aim of strengthening its independence 
and fulfilling all the required criteria to join the European family. 
Undoubtedly, the need to increase the confidence and the participation of 
different communities
1 in the political structures of the new state remains a 
principal goal. 
The key issue is the Serb community within the state. The Serbs have 
established parallel structures (such as courts, schools and hospitals) in their 
areas since 1999. They were  funded by Belgrade and respond directly to 
Belgrade, therefore, operating parallel to the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  
In 2012, four years after the declaration of independence, the functioning 
of these parallel institutions supported by Serbia continues to undermine the 
new government’s efforts to develop inclusive democratic institutions and 
implement minority rights.
2 This is evident in North Mitrovica, where the Serb 
community’s attitude - inclines towards - Belgrade government rather than 
towards Pristina, and where the community is unwilling to accept the 
decentralization plan. As a result, the establishment of new municipalities is 
only partly completed. 
On 9 September, 2010, the UN General Assembly highlighted the advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which concluded that the 
declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international law.
3 
Furthermore, the General Assembly Resolution called for new negotiations 
 
 
1   In Kosovo, the term “community” is used to refer to the different minorities living in the territory. 
The main ethnic groups living in Kosovo are: Albanians (over 90% of the population), Serbs (5%), 
Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians, Bosnians, Gorani, Turks, Croats and Montenegrins (5%). 
2   The overall operation and administration has been reported by OSCE “Parallel structures in Kosovo” 
at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/24618. 
3   ICJ No. 141 “Accordance with International Law of the unilateral declaration of independence in 
Respect of Kosovo”, decision of 22 July 2010. Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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between Kosovo and Serbia, under UN supervision
4 in relation to the so-called 
good neighbourly relations, which is the key criterion for integrating the 
Western Balkans into  the European Union (EU). The technical dialogue 
directed towards the eventual normalization of relations between Kosovo and 
Serbia started on 8 March 2011. 
Supervised  independence will end in 2012,  the International Civilian 
Office’s (ICO)
5 mandate in Kosovo ended on 10 September 2012. The end of 
supervised independence depends on the fulfilment of the obligations arising 
from the Ahtisaari plan, rather than on a specific date. As a fundamental part 
of its declaration of independence, Kosovo made it clear to the international 
community that it would stand by the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement (CSP), which was proposed by the then Special Envoy for 
Kosovo, the former Finnish president, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari. The CSP was 
rejected by Serbia and was not adopted by the United Nations Security 
Council. However, the Kosovo Constitution and all the laws are more or less 
based on the CSP principles.  
The decentralization process remains one of the most controversial aspects 
of the Ahtisaari plan. The issue of decentralization, implemented by the 
Ahtisaari package, has been a central issue for Kosovo since 1999, a milestone 
discussed at all levels, from local to international meetings. Local self 
government is indeed one of the strongly emphasized principles of the 
governmental structure of the state. Additionally, when it comes to the issue 
of community rights, having an exceedingly decentralized system at both 
central and local level makes Kosovo open to the power-sharing systems of 
some federal countries. The CSP, the Constitution and allied local self-
government laws ensure that Kosovo has the right to locally self-govern the 
municipalities, to generate their own sources of income and entitlement and 
to obtain grants from the central government.  
One of the main challenges of decentralization in Kosovo was the 
establishment of new municipalities. The process has been often associated 
with the territorial (ethnic) division of the new state, thus troubling the 
different communities. In relation to that, let us consider some of the 
fundamental provisions (in particular the minorities’ rights) of the Ahtisaari 
plan and then move to certain Articles of the Constitution and the 2008 Law 
on Local of Self Government. Finally, we will add some observations on the 
current situation created during the on-going talks between Belgrade and 
Pristina.  
 
 
4   UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/298 of 9 September 2010, “Welcomes the readiness of 
the European Union to facilitate a process of dialogue between the parties; the process of dialogue 
in itself would be a factor for peace, security and stability in the region, and that dialogue would 
be to promote cooperation, achieve progress on the path to the European Union and improve the 
lives of the people”. 
5   The ICO has been operating under the International Steering Group. For further information about 
the operation of the ICO in Kosovo, consult the official page at http://www.ico-kos.org.  Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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2. The Decentralization Process 
2.1 2.1  Decentralization in the Ahtisaari Plan  
The Ahtisaari plan
6 covers a wide range of issues relevant to Kosovo’s future. 
It gives Kosovo the status of an internationally supervised state, protects the 
Serbian community and boosts decentralization and the protection of 
minority rights. It particularly concentrates on adopting the proper measures 
-  with special regard to the Serbian community -  to ensure Kosovo’s non 
Albanian communities’ security and total inclusion. In the light of this 
overview, it marks the path to achieving autonomy; it provides Serbs with 
Enhanced Municipal Competencies – majority municipalities in areas such as 
education, healthcare and cultural affairs, –  and creates the grounds for 
establishing several new municipalities.
7  The plan proposed a sustainable 
system of local self- government with special regard to the concerns of Serbs 
in Kosovo. Therefore, the CSP foresees that five new municipalities will be 
established and one exiting municipality will be extended. These are the so-
called “5+1” new municipalities, in which Serbs would constitute the 
majority.
8 Additional municipalities may be established in consultation with 
minority communities. It allocates to Belgrade the mechanisms to cooperate 
 
 
6   Ahtisaari developed the CSP (Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement) during the 
Vienna negotiations and the proposal was presented to Belgrade and Pristina on 2 February 2007. 
Even if the proposal did not explicitly include independence, some of the specific measures (i.e. 
the right to apply for membership in international organizations) opened the way for the future 
independence of Kosovo. As is known, the CSP was denounced as illegitimate by Belgrade, but it 
was accepted by Kosovo’s institutions. High level talks took place in March 2007, and in the same 
year Ahtisaari presented his final proposals to the UN Security Council, including a recommendation 
for Kosovo’s independence for a specified period of international supervision. This final proposal, 
accepted by Pristina and refused by Belgrade, met the strong opposition of Russia. Under the threat 
of a Russian veto, the UN Security General launched another time limited round of negotiations led 
by a troika of US, EU and Russian negotiators. When the Troika’s negotiations closed without any 
result on 10 December 2007, under the threat of Russia’s UN veto power, Kosovo’s leaders declared 
unilateral independence on 17 February 2008. Full text of the proposal is at: 
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html. 
7   Martti Ahtisaari, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, UN doc S/2007/168 (26 
March 2007), Annex III, Article 4 Enhanced Municipal Competencies: 
4.1 Certain municipalities in Kosovo shall have their own competences enhanced as 
follows: 
4.1.1 The municipality of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica North shall have competence on  higher 
education, including registration and licensing of educational institutions, 
'recruitment, payment of salaries and training of education instructors and 
administrators; 
4.1.2 The municipalities of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica  North,  Graçanicë/Graĉanica, 
Shtërpc/Strpce shall have the competence to provide secondary health care, including 
registration and licensing of health care institutions, recruitment, payment of salaries 
and training of health care personnel and administrators; 
4.1.3 All municipalities where Kosovo’s Serb Community comprises the majority shall 
have: a) The power to be the responsible authority for cultural affairs, including the 
protection and promotion of Serbian and other religious' and cultural heritage and 
local religious communities within the municipal territory, in accordance with  the 
provisions of Annex V of this Settlement;  b)  Enhanced participatory rights in 
appointing Police Station Commanders, as Article 2.6 of Annex VIII of this Settlement 
states. 
8   The new enhanced municipalities where the Serbs are the majority: Mitovice/ North Mitrovica; 
Gracanice, Ranillug, Partesh, Kllokote/Verboce and Novoborde. Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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with and provide financial and technical assistance to these municipalities 
and allows them to join partnerships with broader associations.
9 
According to the plan, Kosovo’s Ministry of Local Government Administration 
(MLGA) should be notified of agreements between the  municipalities and 
Belgrade. The MLGA will review them and, if necessary, amend them in case 
they do not meet Kosovo’s legislative compliance requirements.
10 A similar 
provision in the plan includes financial assistance from Serbia to the Serbian 
majority municipalities, assistance which should be transparent and limited 
“to carry out the municipality’s responsibilities within its own competencies”. 
The Serb majority municipalities may only provide such assistance through 
the Central Banking Authority’s certified accounts in Kosovo. Similarly, in 
education, it provides an autonomous Serbian language university in North 
Mitrovica and empowers other Serb municipalities to borrow text-books and 
curricula developed by the Republic of Serbia. In the case of curricula, 
Kosovo’s Ministry of Education, Science and Technology needs to be notified 
of these curricula.
11 Undoubtedly, the Ahtisaari plan achieves a significant 
autonomy within the newly established Serb municipalities, but its full 
implementation, as we will  show in section 3, some obstacles have to be 
overcome. 
2.2 The Constituion 
The Constitution, of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted by the Assembly of 
Kosovo on 9 April 2008, came into force on 15 June of the same year, after 
the end of the transitional period.
12  It is based on the Ahtisaari plan and 
addresses the multi - ethnic nature of the new state. Albanian and Serbian 
are designated as its main official languages  and special provisions are 
included to protect minority rights. To illustrate: the provisions of Article 5 
(2) state that “Turkish, Bosnian and Roma languages have the status of 
official languages at the municipal level or will be in official use at all levels 
as provided by law”. The chapter on the Rights of Communities and their 
Members
13 sets out the state’s obligations to preserve the language, culture 
and identity of minorities’, as well as other specific obligations to ensure the 
 
 
9   Municipalities will have the right to cooperate with municipalities and institutions in Serbia, 
including the right to receive financial and technical assistance from Serbia, within certain clear 
parameters set by the Ahtissari plan. For the Ahtissari plan text and its explanations consult United 
Nations Office of the special Envoy for  Kosovo (UNOSEK) “Report of the Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status” 
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html.  
10   Ahtisaari, Comprehensive Proposal, Annex III, Article 10.4. 
11   Ahtisaari, Comprehensive Proposal, Annex III, Article 7.1.1. 
12   After the declaration of independence, Kosovo entered a period of transition of 120 days during 
which the former Provisional Institutions of Self-Government prepared to assume full powers. 
Writing and adopting the new Constitution became a central issue in the full implementation of the 
Ahtissari plan. A draft of the Constitution was put out for public debate and approved by the EU 
representative in Kosovo, Mr Pieter Feith; 103 members voted in favour and afterwards, the 
Assembly of Kosovo adopted it. The plan came into force on 15 June 2008. The full text of the 
Constitution is at: http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/?cid=2,302.  
13   Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, section 3.1. Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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political participation and equitable representation of minority communities. 
As a specific mechanism for exchange of practices between the central 
government and Kosovo’s communities, it foresees the creation of a 
Consultative Council for Communities (CCC).
14  This Consultative Council 
includes representatives of communities, among others, whose role would be 
to comment, at an early stage, on legislative or policy initiatives for the 
communities, and who would have their views incorporated in relevant 
projects and programmes. 
Community rights in the legislative process are also protected by the 
Constitution. In order to implement national-level integration, the 
Constitution, in accordance with the CSP provisions, established that 20 of 
the 120 seats of the Assembly of Kosovo are reserved for the representatives 
of non-majority communities;
15 the Serb community will be represented by 
one minister, and another one from the non - majority community, and if the 
Kosovo government has more than 12 ministers, three  must be appointed 
from communities. 
Furthermore, making integration into the judicial system possible, 15 per 
cent of  the judges at the Supreme Court of Kosovo must come from the 
minority communities.
16  In accordance with the importance of community 
rights in Kosovo, Article 78 of the Constitution requires the creation of the 
Assembly Committee on the Rights and Interests of Communities, provided 
that the legislation concerning certain issues will be considered as legislation 
of vital interest. Therefore,  legislation of vital interest requires a double 
majority in order to be adopted, amended or repealed, that is, both the 
Assembly majority and the majority of the deputies holding seats guaranteed 
for communities.
17  In relation to decentralization, it states that 
municipalities are the basic territorial units of local self-government.
18 The 
CSP, the Constitution and the related local self-government laws ensure that 
Kosovo has the right to locally self-govern the municipalities, to generate 
their own sources of income and entitlement and to obtain grants from the 
central governmental level. Additionally Article 143 of the Constitution states 
that the Constitution itself and other legal acts of Kosovo shall be interpreted 
in compliance with the CSP and in case of inconsistency the latter (CSP) shall 
prevail. The repercussion of such provisions is that the municipalities have 
the  right to locally self-govern themselves both at constitutional and 
international level. 
 
 
14   Article 60 of Chapter III of the Constitution foresees the creation of this Council.  
15   Article 64 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo incorporates the CSP. 
16   Article 103.3 states “At least fifteen per cent (15%) of the judges of the Supreme Court, but not 
fewer than three (3) judges, shall be from Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo.” 
17   Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 81. 
18   Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 12 -  (1) states: “1. Municipalities are the basic 
territorial unit of local self-governance in the Republic of Kosovo. 2. The organisation and powers of 
units of local self-government are provided by law.” Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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2.3   The Law on Local - Self Government, 2008. 
As stated above, the Constitution
19 establishes that municipalities are the 
basic units of self-government, exercising exclusive and delegated powers. 
Local governance in Kosovo is regulated by the Law on Local Self 
Government, together with the Law on Administrative Municipal Borders of 
2008 and Law on Local Government Finances (2008). The Law on Local Self-
Government,
20 nr. 03/L-040, specifically determines the “decentralization of 
the powers” from central to local governments or from the matrix to the new 
municipalities. In 1999, under the terms of the new post-conflict situation 
and with the intention of creating a modern close-to-the-citizens system of 
local government, the UNMIK initiated the process of competencies transfer. 
The new Law on Local Self-Government,
21  based on UNMIK Regulation 
2000/45 and the amended UNMIK Regulation 2007/30, created the necessary 
basic conditions and paved the road to functional local governance based on 
the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government of the 
Council of Europe.
22 Nevertheless, the new local self - government related 
laws
23  have introduced new elements in the areas of competencies, 
institutions and territorial organization of the municipalities. In particular, 
the Law on Local Self-Government 
24 - the basis of a democratic function of 
institutions at local level and based on the principles of the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government - sets out a clear local government structure and 
decentralizes over 25 competencies and powers to local governments. 
According to this substantially new law, there are, in general, four types of 
powers provided to the municipalities: enhanced; full and exclusive; 
delegated; and what is called residual competencies. Despite the fact that 
the three latter types of competency apply symmetrically to all 
municipalities, the enhanced competency applies only to the municipalities 
inhabited principally by the Kosovo Serb community (existing or new ones). In 
order to better understand what kind of competencies are accorded to the 
 
 
19   Chapter X, Article 123. 
20   The new Law on Local Self-Government, which entered into force in June 2008, provides that 
municipalities have full competencies in all local issues, including local economic development and 
taxation policies. For more information’s consult: European Parliament-Directorate General for 
external policies, The decentralisation process in Kosovo and the creation of the new municipalities 
(a Kosovo-Albanian and a Kosovo-Serb minority view), 2010, http://www.iris-
france.org/docs/kfm_docs/docs/observatoire-voisinage-europeen/briefing-note-kosovo-
decentralisation-process-published.pdf.  
21   The full text of the law is at: http://www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/ligjet/2008_03-
L040_en.pdf.  
22   Council of Europe, European Charter of Local Self-Government:  Article 3, section 2, at 
http://conventions.coe.int. 
23   Since the entry into force of the new Constitution on 15 June, 2008, Kosovo has signed 41 new laws 
from the Ahtisaari package. Most of the laws in this large package deal with the organization and 
operation of effective local government in Kosovo including: the Law on Local Self-Government 
2008, the Law on Municipal Boundaries, 2008, (which has determined that the territory of the new 
Republic consists of 38 municipalities, 27 of them governed by Kosovo Albanians, 10 by Kosovo Serbs 
and one by Kosovo-Turkish citizens), the Law on Local Elections of 2008, the Law on Education in 
the Republic of Kosovo Municipalities (2008) and the Law on Local Government Finances of 2008. 
24   Chapter III of the Law on Local Self Government. Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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municipalities, Chapter III of the Law on Local Self Government of 2008, sets 
out the following current classifications:  
•  Full and exclusive competency: means that only the municipalities 
have the power to regulate and exercise functions in the specified 
areas. Such competencies include: local economic development; 
urban and rural planning; provision of public pre-primary; primary 
and secondary education; provisions of public primary health care; 
tourism; cultural and leisure activities. 
•  Residual competency: the law on Local Self Government and the CSP 
give the municipalities additional competencies on “matters not 
explicitly excluded from their competence nor assigned to any other 
authority." Such a wide variety of competency given to the 
municipalities is comparable to the power distribution systems in 
certain federalized countries. 
•  Delegated competencies: according to  the Law on Local Self-
Government, all municipalities shall symmetrically exercise 
competencies in delegated central government areas. The new law 
clearly  attributes more delegated competencies to the 
municipalities.
25 In accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of 
the law, municipalities have delegated competencies in the areas 
of: the civil register; voter registration; business registration and 
licensing; distribution of social assistance payments (excluding 
pensions); forestry protection in the municipal territory that the 
central authority has therein delegated. 
•  Enhanced competencies: new additional (enhanced) competencies 
in some areas
26  given to Kosovo Serb municipalities (new and 
existing ones). These asymmetrical allocated competencies comprise 
two particular types: the ones available for certain Kosovo Serb 
municipalities (in areas such as higher education, i.e., the University 
of North Mitrovica, and secondary health-care for the municipalities 
of Gracanica/ Graganice, Strepce/ Strepce and North Mitrovica/ 
Mitrovice), and the ones available for all Kosovo Serb municipalities 
(in areas such as cultural affairs and local police). 
Such an asymmetrical power allocation system, giving more additional or 
enhanced competencies to municipalities inhabited  by a majority of the 
Kosovo Serb communities, aims to accommodate their welfare in the areas 
already mentioned. However, the distribution of power from central to local 
government, by giving more power to the inhabitants of the above-mentioned 
communities, aims to increase their reliance on the CSP and the institutions 
of Kosovo. Though achieving the transfer of powers means going through 
 
 
25   Art 18 Law on Local Self-Government 2008. 
26   Ibid. Article 19 Enhanced Municipal Competencies: “19.1. Certain municipalities explained below 
shall have their own competencies enhanced in the areas of health, education and cultural affairs 
and shall have participatory right in selecting local station police commanders as set forth in the 
subsequent articles.” Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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various stages, and at the moment the situation looks rather positive, the 
transfer of municipal competency has already been completed, the transfer 
of delegated powers is still on-going, the transfer of enhanced competencies 
has not started yet, and during 2009 the transfer of exclusive powers was 
fully completed.
27 
In order to fully implement the Ahtisaari plan, the transfer of the 
competencies from central to local level must be followed by the transfer of 
competencies from existing municipalities to the newly established ones. The 
process began with the establishment of the Pilot Municipal Units (PMUs) and 
continued thereafter during 2010 within the newly created municipalities.
28 
The transfer covered the following areas: property tax, urban planning, 
marital status, cadastre etc. The complete transfer of competencies, as the 
Law on Local Self-Government foresees, is strictly connected with the 
successful implementation of the Ahtisaari package. Nevertheless, it depends 
on the coordination of municipalities as well, but most of all, it is based on 
the will of the communities to collaborate with the central institutions of 
Kosovo without using such powers allocated by the law to increase the 
function of parallel structures and, consequently, the role of Belgrade in the 
new municipalities. This is very evident in the areas of education and 
healthcare where municipalities have exclusive competencies. It is indeed 
hard for the new municipalities to maintain these institutions under their 
control, especially the education system, which during the last decade has 
operated under Serbia’s curricula, and in many cases the institutions rejects 
any kind of assistance from the Kosovo authorities, apart from financial 
assistance and salaries. But it must emphasized that because of sharing 
common language, religion and traditions, the Serbian community living in 
the Kosovo enclaves naturally feels closer to its kin state culture rather than 
to Kosovan culture. 
3. Community Acceptance of Decentralization  
According to its most basic definition, decentralization is the transfer of 
administrative competencies from the central to the local level.
29 Article 3, 
section 2 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government reflects the 
principles of self-government and subsidiarity, and asks European countries to 
implement the principle of the lowest-level self-governing institutions having 
decision-making roles. 
 
 
27   Rezarta Ukimeraj, “The implementation of Kosovo’s Action Plan on Decentralization”, RIT Centre 
for Multidisciplinary Studies 2011, 47 , at https://ritdml.rit.edu/handle/1850/14111.  
28   Transfer of documentation from the matrix municipalities to the newly established ones was 
accompanied by necessary Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) signed regularly by the Ministry 
of Local Government Administration, the Ministry of Finance and the other ministries and 
municipalities. 
29   John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson, Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing 
Countries (published for and on behalf of the United Nations, Kumarian Press, 1999), 16 – 20. Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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Some authors, such as Gurr,
30 and Burgess and Tarr
31have argued that the self 
– government of a specific territory where one ethnic group comprises the 
local majority, can be translated in territorial autonomy. Basing on the 
example of South Tyrol, Gurr argues that territorial autonomy and power 
sharing can give good results in solving ethnic conflict in divided societies.  
For Smith
32 decentralization can play a unifying role for consolidating new 
national identities. 
Others, such as Norris,
33 argue that group autonomy or the decentralization 
of power is not an automatic solution and state that “centralized government 
is thought to enhance integration, decisiveness, uniformity, economies of 
scale, and cost efficiency”. For Norris responsibilities are defined in a more 
clear way in centralized governmental systems and the consequence is 
stability in the decision-making process.  
Lijphart’s
34model of consociational democracy or power-sharing has been 
underlined like a successful model for state-led settlement in deeply divided 
societies from interethnic tensions. Lijphart’s model has been largely 
applicable in the Balkan contest but sometimes it has been misunderstood as 
giving the possibility to the non-dominant groups to unite themselves in 
concentrated geographical areas and proclaim autonomous regions.
35  
According to Zahar,
36 the power sharing system, if utilized in a wrong way, 
leads in a stalemate that can destabilize the state and does not reach 
stability in the decision – making process. 
Leaving aside the different theories, be they consociational or integrative,
37 
decentralization is a familiar process across Europe, but in Kosovo it still 
seems to be an immensely complex and difficult programme. From time to 
time, the reform in local authority power has been used as a tool to increase 
communities’ integration and has been a core subject of the negotiations 
over several issues in Kosovo. Four years have passed since the declaration of 
independence, but decentralization continues to play a key role in the efforts 
to integrate the Serb community into the social and institutional life and, 
furthermore, its correct implementation is crucial to integration into the 
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larger European family. To correctly implement such an ambitious plan, 
cooperation and coordination at both the horizontal level (central 
government) and vertical level (central and local government) is needed, 
and, most importantly, all society must fulfil its responsibilities. 
In December 2009, the International Civilian Office and the government of 
Kosovo presented the -Strategy for Integration of Northern Kosovo
38-  that 
guarantees Kosovo territorial integrity. The Strategy for Integration of 
Northern Kosovo aims to apply the Ahtisaari package as a whole, without 
implementing the CSP selectively.  During the first years, the CSPs 
implementation faced different obstacles, among other things, community 
acceptance proved to be the main difficulty. Community acceptance of the 
decentralization process, both for Albanians and Serbs, is suffering from 
political obstacles rather than as practical ones. Decentralization has been so 
highly politicized that both communities feel suspicious about its benefits. In 
general, decentralization is understood as beneficial to minorities rather than 
as part of the local government reform. Moreover, there is an impression that 
decentralization was a benefit for minority groups only, and not equally 
beneficial for all citizens. Consequently the question is: who is the minority
39 
in the territory of Kosovo?  
3.1 Serbian Community Acceptance. 
For the Serbian community, decentralization reflects negative connotations, 
being associated with the package that paved the way for the declaration of 
independence of Kosovo.
40  Hence, if the majority of the Serb community 
accepted a part of the independence package, they would have to accept the 
independence of Kosovo, which most the Serb community (especially those 
living in North Mitrovica) refuses to do.
41 
One of the main obstacles for its implementation, or its acceptance among 
the Serb community, remains the role of Belgrade and the functioning of its 
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parallel structures in the territory of Serb enclaves. It is of great interest 
that, the classification of such Serbian parallel structures by certain studies 
gives: first, the ones operating south of the Iber River; and the second, ones 
operating in North Kosovo.
42 
Belgrade’s politicians consider decentralization as a mechanism that 
legitimizes the independence of Kosovo rather than as an instrument to 
reinforce and protect the rights of Serbs in Kosovo. Therefore, through its 
parallel structures and financial support, Belgrade has managed to detach the 
Kosovo Serb community from the integration process of Kosovo and used its 
influence by not letting them take part in the larger Kosovan society,
43 and by 
this Belgrade managed to build and control parallel structures
44 within the 
territory of Kosovo. These parallel structures have become the strongest 
mechanisms for boycotting the decentralization process, undermining the 
implementation of the CSP, and, above all, they hinder the functionality of 
the new municipalities. 
The main problem remains the fact that, while these parallel structures 
deliver only financial benefits to the Serbs living in Kosovo, they are unable 
to stimulate development in the enclaves. However, Kosovan salaries cannot 
match the high wages in the parallel municipalities. Nevertheless, there has 
been a weakening of Belgrade’s efforts to control the Kosovo Serb 
community, a weakening that is directly related to the economic crisis that 
has negatively affected Serbia, straining its budget. In such a difficult 
economic situation, the Serbian government is forced to progressively 
decrease its support for the Serb community. In the light of a noticeable 
reduction of control over the Serbs living in Kosovo, Belgrade has cut over 50 
per cent of the extra wages it provided for Kosovo Serbs,
45  and other 
significant budget cuts in the parallel municipalities are an ongoing process. 
The economic situation of Serbia has had an impact on the Kosovo Serbs who 
have returned to the Kosovan budget benefits. This is particularly evident in 
the fields related to healthcare and education professionals. At the same 
time, a number of elderly Serbs have enrolled for the social welfare and 
pensions of Pristina. Furthermore, the increasing participation of members of 
the Serbian community in local elections shows that things are moving in the 
same direction, the Serb community in Kosovo is turning over the Kosovan 
institutions.
46 It can be said that the Serb community, especially those living 
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south of the Iber River, appear to have taken a longer and more pragmatic 
approach towards the decentralization process.
47  Such more pragmatic 
approach towards the decentralization, unfortunately, is not applicable in the 
case of the Serbs living in the three existing northern municipalities of 
Leposaviq, Zubin-Potok and Zvecan and the ones living in North Mitrovica 
which do not collaborate with the Kosovan authorities. 
The parallel institutions are the only ones used by people in North 
Mitrovica. Because of the pure ethnic composition of the municipality, they 
do not depend on an interaction with Kosovan institutions or Kosovo Albanians 
in their everyday lives. Given the small population of around 50,000 
inhabitants, Serbia finds it fairly simple to procure adequate financing, 
certainly more generous than those Pristina offers. This situation allows the 
Serb community in North Mitrovica to have a more militant approach towards 
anything resembling integration; hence, opposition to decentralization begins 
with the non participation in the  local elections, which would create 
legitimate municipalities.
48 
The aftermath of the past unclear definition of the - future status - of 
Kosovo, the North continues to be one of the major problematic areas facing 
not only Pristina but also all parties involved in the created situation. 
Consequently, since 1999 the North Kosovo represents 15 per cent of Kosovo’s 
territory outside Pristina’s control. If, at the beginning, the Kosovo Serbs 
considered it an oasis where the Serbian population and institutions would 
continue to function and develop, now it is a symbol of corruption. Receiving 
so many funds from Pristina, Belgrade and the international community made 
corruption inevitable,
49  and, because of a lack of effective policing, 
mismanagement of funds and smuggling activities gave people a golden era 
and made them prefer living in this unclear status, and the feel that it was 
suitable to keep profiting from such high budgets from all parties. However, 
to Belgrade, the influence in North Kosovo represents fertile ground for 
playing politics, even at the international level. Furthermore, Belgrade tries 
hard to distance itself from the criminal activities and lawlessness occurring 
in the North Mitrovica, while, at the same time, it provides support and 
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finance to the institutions there, even though this position, at times, brings 
clashes. 
The current situation in this part of Kosovo continues to be critical 
especially during 2012, risking to become crucial for the further political 
development situation of both Kosovo and Serbia. All this points to the fact 
that the Kosovan government does not yet have a strategy to dissolve parallel 
structures, and relies on the decrease of Belgrade’s financial commitments. 
However, Brussels’ policies were more persuasive than they were in the past, 
forcing Belgrade to change its position regarding the functioning of parallel 
structures, especially those established in North Kosovo. It seems emblematic 
that a day after submitting its application for EU membership in Stockholm, 
Serbia committed 42 million euros for parallel structures.
50  Now, after 
receiving the status of EU candidate country, it is showing no sign that the 
policy towards the participation of Serbian communities in the political 
institutions of Kosovo will change. A few days after Serbia received candidate 
country status, Boris Tadic, at that time Serbian president, declared that the 
Serbian Constitution provisions would be fully applied by holding elections in 
all its territory (North Kosovo included).  This hybrid position of Belgrade, 
having one leg in the EU and the other in Kosovo, undermines not only the 
function of the new republic but also the good inter-ethnic relations in the 
whole region. 
3.2 Albanian Community Acceptance 
Decentralization has also been politicized for the Albanian community of 
Kosovo. The Albanian community is also divided when it comes to accepting 
decentralization. The majority of the population and the government agree 
with the process of decentralization, admitting it is a little compromise for a 
greater cause – the full independence of Kosovo. Yet, part of the population 
sees decentralization as a negative process. The self-determination 
movement (Vetevendosja), in particular, has been the most outspoken actor 
against decentralization in Kosovo.
51 Its members perceive decentralization 
as a loss of Kosovo’s administrative control and sovereignty over its 
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territory,
52 which would lead a lack of stability and foster the creation of 
more enclaves like the one in North Mitrovica. Moreover, this movement and 
that part of the population that opposes the CSP plan see its implementation 
as the transposition of the Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) situation, where the 
creation of the Republic of Srpska and the installation of the executive, the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), could be possible 
inside Kosovo’s territory and would create the same asymmetrical and reliant 
power-sharing, as in the Bosnia-Herzegovina model.
53 
Therefore, a Kosovo without full control over its entire territory cannot be 
an independent Kosovo. In consequence, decentralization does not serve the 
purpose of true independence. 
One of the most discussed topics is the kind of relation between these new 
municipalities and the central government. According to the Ahtisaari 
package and to related laws, municipalities are autonomous in the exercise of 
their exclusive and delegated competencies under the MLGA supervision. The 
government of Kosovo cannot directly  invalidate municipal legislative or 
executive acts, notwithstanding that they are not in line with the 
Constitution or with other Kosovan laws. In such a case, the government may 
request municipalities to re-examine such decisions or acts, but the 
execution of those acts will not be suspended. After the request of re-
examine, municipalities are obliged to probe such decisions or acts.  If 
municipalities respond negatively, or do not answer within a given deadline, 
the government can only bring the issue to a competent court or to the 
Constitutional Court.
54  Such lack of government intervention is what the 
central government fears the most about fully-functioning new 
municipalities. 
Another fear, promptly misused by politicians, relates to actions that 
violate the Constitution or other laws the new municipalities might legislate. 
However, this seems to be a false fear because the government has full legal 
authority to dissolve municipal assemblies and to call for new municipal 
elections. 
Undoubtedly, positive steps have been taken the past four years. There is 
considerable progress in the establishment and functionality of the new 
municipalities,
55 except in the new municipality in North Mitrovica. A tense 
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situation and several ethnic problems still prevent the creation of this 
municipality. The future of North Mitrovica should be within Kosovo’s 
boundaries, completing the decentralization process established in the 
Ahtisaari package, which is the sign of the will to accomplish the 
establishment of the boundaries in the Balkans. Mitrovica constitutes the 
inter-ethnicity model in the whole international community, especially, but 
not only, in the successful creation of a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. If such 
a programme fails, the division of the territories by only ethnic lines will have 
a domino effect, involving the whole area and threatening regional stability 
in the Balkans.
56 Therefore, any kind of proposal to divide North Mitrovica 
from Kosovo should be rejected by the international community for the sake 
of the stability in the region and long-lasting peace in the Balkans. 
4. Talks between Belgrade and Pristina, and the European 
Perspective  
On 9 September 2010, the UN General Assembly highlighted the advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice, which concluded that the 
declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international law.
57 
Furthermore, the General Assembly Resolution called for new negotiations 
between Kosovo and Serbia under UN supervision,
58 with respect to the so-
called ‘good neighbourly relations’, which is the key criterion for integrating 
the Western Balkans into the EU. Technical dialogue directed towards the 
eventual normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia started on 8 
March 2011. There are some asymmetries in this dialogue, some ‘sensors’ of 
no reciprocity between the two parties involved in technical talks. Except for 
the requests Serbia advanced for the Serbian minority living in Kosovo without 
conceding any kind of privilege to Albanians living in Serbia, another sensor of 
such non-reciprocity seems to emerge, that is, Serbian officials will be able to 
enter into Kosovo’s territory, but not the opposite.
59  Local medias have 
highlighted that such dialogue held in Brussels seems to be strictly addressed 
to what Belgrade has leaked as the main subject of the dialogue, that is, the 
internal issues of Kosovo, and not to the issue of Kosovo and Serbia itself. As 
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such, some examples are: Serbia’s demands for Kosovo’s Serbs the Albanian 
community present in Serbia, especially in Presheva/Prehevo, 
Medvegja/Medveja and Bujanoc/Bujanovac, are not included; the talks on 
custom stamps imposed only for Kosovo and not for Serbia and the issue of 
car licence plates, obliging Kosovo to issue UNMIK car licence plates for the 
next five years. 
Local media emphasized that the role of the EU is unclear. On one hand, the 
EU is the mediator of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, and, on the 
other hand, the EU rules over the dialogue through the executive powers of 
EULEX. Undoubtedly, the main unspoken subject of the problem is the 
Serbian refusal to recognize the independence of Kosovo; also, the 
Constitution of Serbia proclaims that Kosovo is part of Serbia.
60  As such, 
Serbia still finances and controls parallel structures in Kosovo, especially in 
the North. As a result of the policies pursued by Belgrade in this area, on 9 
December 2011, the Council of the European Union postponed its decision to 
give Serbia the status of European Union candidate until March 2012, making 
specific reference to, amongst other things, the situation in North Kosovo.
61 
As a result, after the first months, where talks were concentrated on topics 
such as the civil registry, land registry documents, customs, university 
diplomas, energy and telecommunications, the attention turned back to the 
issue of ‘official representation’ of Kosovo in the region; with or without the 
1244 Resolution the question was whether or not to accept the Republic of 
Kosovo. 
In fact, in all the negotiations held between the two parties, in accordance 
with Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo has had to 
erase the reference to republic from its own name.  The answer to the 
question ‘what are the talks about?’ seems to be quite obvious: to find the 
right ‘halfway’, which means that the open issue between the two parties will 
be neither an obstacle for Serbia’s full process of integration into the EU nor 
an obstacle for the completion of Kosovo’s international integration into the 
EU. But what is the price of such deliverance? 
Once more, the issue of the creation of the new municipalities (Serbian 
enclaves) and the mechanisms Belgrade cooperates with and provides 
financial and technical assistance to, as the Ahtisaari plan foresees, turns out 
to be crucial for the latest developments in the region. The visit of the then 
Serbian president, Boris Tadic, in Kosovo, to celebrate the Orthodox 
Christmas Day on 7 January 2012, was protested  against by hundreds of 
citizens, and undoubtedly offered the Serbian government the possibility of 
underlining its position about the Kosovo issue once more. As a matter of 
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fact, this visit was announced as a normal religious visit and the government 
of Kosovo approved it under an EU request to the offices in Belgrade and 
Pristina. Nevertheless, what Tadic declared to the journalists outside the 
monastery totally violated such agreement. Despite all the guarantees of the 
Kosovan state authorities, Tadic transformed his ‘religious’ visit into a 
‘political’ one. When the journalists asked if Serbia would recognize Kosovo, 
he replied “Never”, emphasizing that Serbia would not remove Serbian 
institutions from Kosovo.
62 As a result of this declaration, hundreds of people 
staged protests in the principal towns of Kosovo and the government of 
Kosovo declared that the institutions would not issue Tadic with permission to 
visit Kosovo again since he continuously violates the terms of agreements that 
both countries agreed for such purpose. Recently, the EU has mediated talks 
held in Brussels and talks has specifically focused on how Kosovo will be 
identified on the table top cards, that is, to identify how each conference 
participant is represented (the so-called regional presentation moniker). The 
disagreement on this topic shows some similarities with the longstanding 
dispute between Macedonia and Greece. Both governments held opposite 
positions: Pristina wants ‘Republic of Kosovo’ in on its sign, but Belgrade 
insists Kosovo be described according to the [UN Resolution] 1244’.
63  This 
dispute between the parties seems have been going on for four years: Kosovo 
pretends Serbia does not have the right to refer to the 1244 Resolution 
because it was approved in 1999, when Serbia did not exist as a state; Serbia 
pretends that the 1244 Resolution is of vital importance – a kind of red line 
that should not be passed.
64 
Since Kosovo declared its independence, it has accepted substantial 
compromises in order to be recognized as an independent state, but there is 
no doubt that if, under strong pressure, it accepts a compromise with Serbia 
to give up the name ‘Republic’ that defines its juridical status, it would 
become a milestone in Kosovo’s future history. Nevertheless, during the 
celebration of the fourth year of independence, Prime Minister Hashim Thaci 
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and President Jahjaga reiterated that the Republic of Kosovo is an undeniable 
and non-negotiable fact, a reality accepted by everyone.
65 
As stated below, 2012 is the year in which supervised independence and the 
implementation of priorities for European Kosovo will end; that is the 
International Civilian Office,
66  which operates under the 25-nation 
International Steering Group (ISG), will end its mandate in Kosovo this year. 
For this purpose, the ISG which supported the pledge of the government of 
the Republic of Kosovo gave in its statement and the Parliament of Kosovo 
expressed its readiness to offer full support to the government to end such 
supervision. The government has to complete all obligations deriving from 
this resolution. Therefore, the government is expected to enact legislation 
predisposed  to ensure human rights and to strengthen democratic 
institutions. In the above-mentioned statement, the ISG urged both parties to 
work together in order to avoid any type of tension. It urged Serbia to 
“refrain from interfering  in Kosovo, including by withdrawing its police, 
security, and other state presence … to ensure that its local elections are not 
extended into northern Kosovo”.
67 It also urged the government of Kosovo to 
“reach out actively to its Serb citizens, particularly those in its northern 
municipalities”,
68 by increasing the role they play in running their own affairs 
and by respecting their language and identity. The International Civilian 
Representative (ICR)
69 Mr. Pieter Feith, urges Serbs both in Kosovo and Serbia 
to accept the territorial integrity of Kosovo. But the reality on the ground 
seems to be rather far from such ‘auspices’. 
On 14 February 2012, Serb community living in northern Kosovo (North 
Mitrovica), started a two-day referendum in which people were asked to vote 
on the question: “Do you accept the institutions of the so-called Republic of 
Kosovo seated in Pristina?”. 
Keeping in mind that Serbs in North Kosovo (especially the ones living in North 
Mitrovica) have never accepted the independence of Kosovo, the result of the 
vote, as was expected, was ‘no’. According to the organizers, 99.7 per cent 
of the voters rejected the government of Kosovo. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
denied that the situation in North Mitrovica, ever since the day Kosovo 
 
 
65   Kosovo has been recognized by 91 states. The complete list of the states that have recognized 
Kosovo is available here: http://www.kosovothanksyou.com, a website that monitors who 
recognized Kosovo as an independent state.  
66   The ICO assisted the International Steering Group, whose mandate is to establish a “multiethnic 
society which shall govern itself democratically, and with full respect for the rule of law”. The ICR 
was appointed by the International Steering Group (ISG) on 28 February 2008.The end of the 
supervised independence depends on the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Ahtisaari 
plan. For further information of the operation of the ICO in Kosovo consult the official page, ICO, 
About us, at http://www.ico-kos.org/?id=9.  
67   Fourteenth meeting of the International Steering Group for Kosovo, 24th January 2012, Vienna, 
section 3, at http://www.ico-kos.org/data/Image/2012_ISG_Vienna_Communique_ENG.pdf. 
68   Ibid.  
69   The ICR supported by the ICO, pursuant to the Ahtisaari plan, was appointed by the ISG. The ICR 
was the ‘final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation’ of the Plan and had the ‘ability to annul 
decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose 
actions he/she determines to be inconsistent’ with the Plan. Ahtisari plan, section IX, articles 3 and 
4 at http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf.  Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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declared independence in 2008, has been out of control. In November 2011, 
the last attempt of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping force to 
dismantle barricades erected by the Serbs alongside the border failed. Over 
50 KFOR soldiers were wounded during this attempt. 
However it is to be noted that, 40,000 members
70 of the Serb community 
living in North Kosovo use only Serbian parallel structures, disregarding the 
official Kosovan ones. Under EU pressure, the Belgrade government call the 
referendum in question “unconstitutional”, on the other hand, the Kosovo’s 
official position is clear: with respect to the territorial integrity of Kosovo as 
a unit state, under no circumstance will there be a special status for North 
Mitrovica.
71 The EU itself ignored the result of the referendum, preferring to 
concentrate on further development of the technical dialogue. On the third 
day of the ninth dialogue round that took place on 24 February 2012 in 
Brussels, an agreement was finally reached concerning both regional 
cooperation and border checkpoint management. In the end, the parties met 
halfway: the country’s name will be written Kosovo*, with an asterisk and the 
complete explanation will be: “This name does not judge the stances towards 
the status and its full accordance with the UN Resolution 1244 and the ICJ 
Opinion about Kosovo’s independence declaration”.
72 On one hand, Serbia has 
not “lost the 1244 Resolution”, and on the other, Kosovo has not “won the 
Republic” but, nevertheless, in addition to the 1244 Resolution, there will be 
the ICJ opinion. 
So, Kosovo* (territorial integrity of the Republic of Yugoslavia –  an in-
accordance-with-international-law declaration of independence) seems to be 
the right moniker for both parties. Apart from the form, which is not the 
ideal solution, both parties hope that such agreement will bring important 
benefits. Serbia undoubtedly welcomed these agreements which were 
reached one week before the European Council’s decision to confer candidate 
status on Serbia. For Kosovo, this further step  -  automatically makes it a 
participant with full rights in regional meetings and enables further progress 
towards contractual agreements with the EU, especially the signing of the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement, the first step towards prospective 
 
 
70   It is estimated that there are over 120,000 ethnic Serbs in Kosovo; 40,000 of those live in North 
Kosovo on the border with Serbia. The rest of the members of Serb community live in enclaves 
scattered throughout the territory. While it has been noted that Serbs in southern enclaves are 
more open to working with the institutions of Kosovo, those living in the north still depend on 
Belgrade. Kosovo agency of statistics, People on the move: an analysis of international, national and 
local mobility of Kosovo people, 2011 at http://esk.rks-
gov.net/rekos2011/repository/flipbook/2/People-on-the-move-ENG/#/0.  
71   “The future of North Mitrovica is the same as that of the sovereign state of Kosovo. The future of 
the north is the future of Kosovo, always respecting the Constitution and laws of Kosovo; respecting 
the document of President Ahtisaari, so under no circumstance will there be special status, or any 
proposal read in media, and such an idea has not been presented or discussed, or proposed by 
anyone. So the north of Mitrovica is part of Kosovo. Kosovo will function as a state unit, with 
territorial integrity respected and guaranteed and recognized internationally,”-  said  Mr Hashim 
Thaci, prime minister of the Republic of Kosovo in an interview on 27 October 2012 text of the 
interview at the official website of the prime minister of the Republic of  Kosovo 
http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/index.php?page=2,9,2640.  
72   Agreement on Regional Cooperation and IBM technical protocolo, 24.02.2012, Ref: EU12-047EN at 
http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11884_en.htm.   Cukani – Prishtina-Belgrate Talks 
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EU integration.
73  Undoubtedly, these agreements strengthen regional 
cooperation and guarantee necessary representation; they represent the 
dedication of both parties to the future European perspective. After the 
decentralization process has completed its cycle as it is foreseen in the CSP, 
in the coming years it remains to continue in full accordance with the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government. Thus, required reforms and 
further laws should be concentrated more on increasing round-table meetings 
with citizens rather than on ethnic criteria. Offering more information about 
what decentralization is and what further reforms consist of, will help 
citizens to better understand the various benefits they can achieve from such 
measures and will lead to an easier acceptance and implementation of 
different necessary reforms. Last but not least, the civil society in Kosovo will 
have the opportunity to contribute to the construction of stability in Kosovo, 
preventing fragmentation and separation of the territory by diminishing 
bipolarity and ethnic fragility between the two major communities. 
Kosovan and Serbian politicians must change their partisan programmes and 
work to enforce democracy and law in both countries, and especially in North 
Mitrovica. In light of this, the community needs to change its perception of 
decentralization. The creation of the new state of Kosovo is a reality. The 
wheel of history cannot be changed, so it will be better for both parties to 
work together to make the system of decentralization efficient with a view to 
further integration in Europe. 
5. Conclusions 
Administrative decentralization, that is the distribution of powers from 
central to local government authorities, is a common process across Europe. 
As this article show, such a principle is enshrined in the main documents 
concerning the independence of Kosovo. Nevertheless, during the first years 
its implementation, decentralization has faced different obstacles and 
communities remain suspicious about its benefits. 
Undoubtedly, the full implementation of the Ahtisaari package remains a 
key issue not only for the European future of the country but, above all, to 
prove that the people of Kosovo can work together to build a civic society 
where they are wholly integrated as citizens of the same country. 
Decentralization constitutes the best opportunity for the integration of the 
Serb community and for the correct functionality of the new state. But in 
order to be understood and accepted as part of a common process for all the 
citizens, it must not follow only ethnic lines. Decentralization along only 
 
 
73   After the agreement with Serbia, the European Commission will start the feasibility study in Kosovo. 
It will take several months to assess the ability of the country to start the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the EU. During the talks for reaching such agreement for Kosovo, the 
accelerated visa liberalization, the trade and contractual agreements with the EU and  the 
accelerated membership in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development also will be 
discussed.  
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ethnic lines would jeopardize the stability of the region, bringing a domino 
effect into the Balkans. The Ahtisaari package preserves the territorial 
integrity of Kosovo and maintains the autonomy of the Serb community in 
areas where Serbs constitute the majority of the population. Therefore, it 
seems to be the best option to maintain the multi-ethnic structure of the new 
state. Therefore, the partition of Mitrovica along ethnic lines does not match 
with the values enshrined in the principles of decentralization as set out in 
the Ahtisaari package and as established by the Constitution of the new state.  
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